In 2006 the Indian Government launched a policy initiative to reform provision of public services using information technology services. Political forces have resisted, for varying reasons, from allowing this to happen in a full-fledged way. Through the investigation of a new era of administrative reform, in which digital technologies may be used to facilitate citizens' access to the state, Jennifer Bussell tries to explain why some governments improve public services more effectively than others. Drawing on a sub-national analysis of twenty Indian states, a field experiment, statistical modeling, case studies, interviews of citizens, bureaucrats, and politicians, and comparative data from South Africa and Brazil, Bussell shows that the extent to which politicians rely on income from petty and grand corruption is closely linked to variation in the timing, management, and comprehensiveness of reforms. The volume is essential to scholars interested in both corruption and Indian politics, as well as practitioners and promoters of reform in public service delivery more generally.